Computational Social Choice
Links to important resources and to essential information
- Recommended reading: Handbook on Computational Social Choice
- A simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be found here.
- A proof that the Uncovered Set returns the largest set of Pareto-optimal candidates can be found here.
- Introduction to Multiwinner Voting (book chapter).
Slides from the lectures:
- Introduction to voting
- Strategic Voting
- Distortion of Voting Rules
- Approval-Based Committee Elections
- Committee Elections with Ranking-Based Preferences
- Participatory Budgeting
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items
- Fair Allocation of Divisible Resources: Cake Cutting
- Kidney Exchange
- Stable Matchings
- The Scretary Problem and Public Decisions
Recording from the lectures (available in Polish):
- Lecture 1 (Introduction to voting)
- Lecture 2 (Introduction to voting + Strategic Voting)
- Lecture 3 (Strategic Voting + Distortion)
- Lecture 4 (Distortion + Apportionment)
- Lecture 5 (Apportionment + Approval-Based Committee Elections)
- Lecture 6 (Approval-Based Committee Elections + Committee Elections with Ranking-Based Preferences)
- Lecture 7 (Participatory Budgeting)
- Lecture 8 (Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods)
- Lecture 9 (Fair Allocation of Divisible Goods: Cake Cutting)
- Lecture 10 (Introduction to Market Design)
- Lecture 11 (Stable Matchings)
The assignmnents with their due dates are available in moodle. Sollutions to the assignments must be sent through moodle.